Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
国家中医药管理局关于印发中医药继续教育“十一五”规划的通知
国家中医药管理局
国中医药发〔2006〕69号
国家中医药管理局关于印发中医药继续教育“十一五”规划的通知
各省、自治区、直辖市卫生厅局、中医药管理局，局各直属单位：
现将我局编制的《中医药继续教育“十一五”规划》印发给你们，请结合本地区、本单位工作实际，认真贯彻落实。
附件：中医药继续教育“十一五”规划
二○○六年十二月六日
附件：
中医药继续教育“十一五”规划
“十一五”时期是我国全面建设小康社会的关键时期，中医药（包括民族医药）行业面临着新的发展机遇和严峻的挑战。为了切实加强中医药人才培养，全面提高中医药队伍素质，为中医药事业发展提供可靠的人才保障，根据《中医药事业发展“十一五”规划》，制定本规划。
一、规划背景
“十五”期间，中医药继续教育工作取得了新的进展。中医药继续教育工作的领导和组织管理进一步加强，已初步建立起全行业的继续教育管理网络。开展中医药继续教育工作的有关法规和制度逐步健全，保证了中医药继续教育的健康发展。中医药继续教育的内容不断丰富，形式更加多样化，以各类专门人才培养为主要任务的专项继续教育有了较快发展，如老中医药专家学术经验继承、优秀中医临床人才研修、乡镇卫生院中医临床技术骨干培训等取得了显著成效，有效地推进了中医药人才队伍建设。中医药继续教育的规模和实施领域继续扩大，教育质量和效益有一定的提高，“十五”计划提出的中医药继续教育覆盖率和中医药人员受教育率的主要指标基本实现。
但是，中医药继续教育工作还存在不少问题。中医药继续教育发展不平衡，农村、城市社区和西部一些地区的中医药继续教育工作仍是薄弱环节；中医药继续教育管理网络尚不健全，相关制度和配套措施尚不完善，管理不够规范；中医药继续教育内容、形式和途径还不能完全适应培养各类中医药人才的客观需要，教育质量和效益有待提高；经费投入不足，基地建设进展不快，中医药继续教育实施网络尚未建立。这些都有待于“十一五”期间逐步改进和加以解决。
二、指导思想和基本原则
“十一五”时期开展中医药继续教育工作的指导思想是：以邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想为指导，全面落实科学发展观，牢固树立科学人才观，以提高中医药队伍整体素质、增强继承与创新能力为出发点，重点加强高层次中医药人才和农村、城市社区中医药人才培养，全面提升中医药服务能力，为人民群众的健康服务。
“十一五”时期开展中医药继续教育工作必须坚持以下原则：
（一）突出特色、继承创新。中医药继续教育必须保持和发扬中医药特色优势，走突出自身特点的发展道路。要遵循中医药学术特点和中医药人才成长规律，构建具有行业特色的继续教育模式。要把中医药继续教育的落脚点放到增强中医药专业技术人员的中医药继承与创新能力，保持和发扬中医药特色和优势上。
（二）统筹兼顾、协调发展。要统筹不同形式的中医药继续教育活动，实行以开展各类继续教育项目为主要形式的学分制继续教育与以专门人才培养为主要任务的专项继续教育并举，兼顾不同地区、不同领域、不同层次、不同类别中医药人才的培养。要统筹兼顾城市大中型医疗机构继续教育与农村及城市社区基层医疗机构继续教育、高层次人才培养与基层人才培养、中医人才培养与中药人才培养，促进协调发展。
（三）行业管理、条块结合。要健全各级中医药继续教育管理机构，完善管理体系，加强行业对中医药继续教育工作的指导和管理。要加强行业与地方政府有关部门的协调与合作，取得多方的支持与指导，逐步完善行业管理与地方管理相结合的管理体制。
（四）联系实际、讲求实效。要紧紧围绕继承和发展中医药事业的需要，紧密联系各类中医药人员的工作实际，增强中医药继续教育的针对性、实用性和先进性。要加强质量监控和效果评价，实现中医药继续教育规模、数量与质量、效益的协调发展。
三、发展目标和主要任务
（一）“十一五”时期中医药继续教育发展目标
1．总体目标：
在“十五”中医药继续教育发展的基础上，中医药继续教育规模继续扩大，实施领域进一步拓展，质量和效益明显提高，运行机制比较完善，中医药人才培养和队伍建设得到加强，与中医药事业发展的需要相适应。
2．分类目标：
规模继续扩大。全面实行学分制中医药继续教育的县级中医医院比率达到90%；中医药医疗机构中的中医药专业技术人员接受继续教育并获得规定学分的比率达到85％（西部、边远地区达到60％）。
实施领域进一步拓展。巩固和扩大高层次中医药人才培养成果，继续开展优秀中医临床人才研修和老中医药专家学术经验继承等工作。开展临床中药师和中医护理人员的专项培养。拓展农村和城市社区中医药人才培养范围。开展各层次中医药人员必修内容的培训，提高运用中医药传统理论和方法进行中医药服务的能力。大力开展特色疗法、适宜技术等专项技能培训，更好地发挥中医药特色和优势。
质量和效益明显提高。建立健全中医药继续教育质量和效益评估制度，加强中医药继续教育师资队伍建设和教材建设，提高各类继续教育项目和各种人才培养项目的质量和效益，推进中医药人才队伍建设。
运行机制比较完善。有效的激励机制和约束机制基本建立，管理机制、经费保障机制进一步完善。建立全行业继续教育信息化管理体系，60%以上的省（区、市）实施计算机网络管理。
（二）“十一五”期间中医药继续教育的主要任务
1．推进各级各类中医药专业技术人员和管理人员的继续教育。不断丰富中医药继续教育内容，积极探索中医药继续教育新形式，大力开展现代远程继续教育，不断推进学分制继续教育工作。“十一五”期间重点开展中医经典理论培训、临床中药知识与技能培训以及中医药管理知识的培训。
2．加强高层次中医药人才培养。继续做好老中医药专家学术经验继承工作，在总结前三批继承工作经验的基础上，开展第四批继承工作，培养1000名高层次中医药人才。开展第二批优秀中医临床人才研修项目，培养200名优秀中医临床人才。启动西医师学习中医高级研修班，培养100名能应用中医药理论和方法解决临床问题的高层次临床人才。结合重点学科建设，培养400名中医药学科带头人。
3．突出农村和城市社区中医药人才培养。开展县级中医医院专科（专病）技术骨干培训项目，培养专科（专病）技术骨干5000名。继续实施乡镇卫生院中医临床技术骨干培训项目，到2007年，培养2万名中医临床技术骨干。开展乡镇卫生院中医特色优势培训项目，计划培训4万名中医特色优势技术骨干。根据《乡村医生中医药知识与技能基本要求》（国中医药发〔2006〕15号），开展乡村医生的中医药知识与技能培训。继续总结和推广农村基层优秀中医成才规律与临床经验。开展城市社区中医类别全科医师岗位培训和规范化培训，对其他城市社区卫生技术人员和护理人员进行中医药知识与技能的培训，满足城市社区对中医药服务的需求。
4．加大中医药专项知识与技能培训力度。开展中医特色诊疗技术、中医临床传统技能等专项培训。强化中医药人员防控传染性疾病、防治重大疾病能力培训，强化中医药人员医德医风、医学伦理、中医药法律法规等知识培训。
5．抓好中医住院医师规范化培训。加强中医住院医师规范化培训的教材建设，改进考核办法。
6．建立健全中医药继续教育实施网络。依托现有的中医药医疗、教育、科研等机构，加强各层次各类别中医药继续教育基地建设。“十一五”期间，国家中医药管理局先期建设一批局级中医药优势学科继续教育基地，并陆续建设一批局级农村、城市社区中医药知识与技能培训示范基地。各地中医药管理部门根据本地区实际情况和需求，建设一批中医药继续教育基地。
四、保障措施
(一)加强领导，为中医药继续教育发展提供组织保障。各级中医药管理部门要提高对中医药继续教育在继承和发展中医药事业中的重要地位和作用的认识，增强发展中医药继续教育的紧迫感和责任感。建立健全各级中医药继续教育管理组织,逐步完善管理网络。加强行业与地方有关部门的沟通，积极营造中医药继续教育发展的良好环境。
(二)完善机制，为中医药继续教育发展提供政策保障。积极推进中医药继续教育的法规建设，完善中医药继续教育运行机制，重点强化对受教育者的激励机制和对实施继续教育单位的约束机制。加强理论研究，探索中医药继续教育新机制。定期对中医药继续教育管理工作进行评估，对先进单位和个人予以表彰和奖励，对出现的问题及时予以纠正。认真落实中医药继续教育与中医药专业技术人员的考核、聘任、晋升和执业再注册等密切结合的有关规定，并把单位开展中医药继续教育工作的情况作为单位年终考核和领导干部考核的主要内容之一。
(三)规范管理，为中医药继续教育发展提供制度保障。按照《中医药继续教育规定》的要求，建立健全中医药继续教育登记制度、统计制度、评估制度。强化对中医药继续教育过程的监督检查，制定评估指标，加强质量监控。疏通管理渠道，创新管理手段，利用现有信息、网络资源，构建中医药继续教育信息管理体系，及时掌握并监督各地的中医药继续教育活动，实现中医药继续教育管理的科学化、规范化和制度化。
(四)增加投入，为中医药继续教育发展提供经费保障。充分调动各方面积极性，多渠道筹集中医药继续教育经费。各级中医药管理部门要担负起对中医药人才培养的责任，逐步增加对中医药继续教育的经费投入。各中医药机构要切实把中医药继续教育作为增强单位核心竞争力的重要手段，确定继续教育的经费投入比例，并随着业务的发展逐步增加投入。中医药人员是继续教育的直接受益者，也应当承担部分费用。鼓励社会各界筹集中医药继续教育资金，建立中医药继续教育资金筹集使用的良性机制，确保中医药继续教育可持续发展。
